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Two Flaws in Business Cycle Dating 




Using “business cycle accounting,” Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006) conclude that 
models of financial frictions which create a wedge in the intertemporal Euler equation are 
not promising avenues for modeling business cycle dynamics. There are two reasons that 
this conclusion is not warranted. First, small changes in the implementation of business 
cycle accounting overturn Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan’s conclusions. Second, one way 
that shocks to the intertemporal wedge affect the economy is by their spillover effects 
onto other wedges. This potentially important mechanism for the transmission of 
intertemporal-wedge shocks is not identified under business cycle accounting. Chari, 
Kehoe, and McGrattan potentially understate the importance of these shocks by adopting 
the extreme position that spillover effects are zero. 
 
Keywords: business cycle accounting, financial frictions, intertemporal wedge, spillover 
effects 
JEL codes: E32, E331. Introduction
C h a r i ,K e h o ea n dM c G r a t t a n( 2 0 0 5 )( C K M )a r g u et h a tap r o c e d u r et h e yc a l lB u s i n e s sC y c l e
Accounting (BCA) is useful for identifying promising directions for model development.1 The
key substantive ﬁnding of CKM is that ﬁnancial frictions like those analyzed by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) (CF) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) (BGG) are not promising
avenues for studying business cycles. Based on our analysis of business cycle data for the
US in the 1930s and for the US and 14 other OECD countries in the postwar period, we ﬁnd
that the CKM conclusion is not warranted.
The BCA strategy begins with the standard real business cycle (RBC) model, augmented
by introducing four shocks, or ‘wedges’. A vector autoregressive representation (VAR) for
the wedges is estimated using macroeconomic data on output, consumption, investment
and government consumption.2 The macroeconomic data are assumed to be observed with a
small measurement error whose variance is ﬁxed a priori. The ﬁtted wedges have the property
that when they are fed simultaneously to the augmented RBC model, the model reproduces
the four macroeconomic data series up to the small measurement error. The importance of
a particular wedge is determined by feeding it to the model, holding all the other wedges
constant, and comparing the resulting model predictions with the data. One of the wedges,
the intertemporal wedge, is the shock that enters between the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution in consumption and the rate of return on capital. CKM argue that this wedge
contributes very little to business cycle ﬂuctuations, for the following two reasons: (i) the
wedge accounts for only a small part of the movement in macroeconomic variables during
recessions and (ii) the wedge drives consumption and investment in opposite directions,
while these two variables display substantial positive comovement over the business cycle.
CKM assert that their conclusions are robust to various model perturbations, including the
introduction of adjustment costs in investment.
There are two reasons that BCA does not warrant being pessimistic about the useful-
ness of models of ﬁnancial frictions such as those proposed in CF or BGG. First, CKM’s
conclusions are not robust to small changes in the way they implement BCA. For example,
when we redo CKM’s calculations for the 1982 recession, we reproduce their ﬁnding that the
intertemporal wedge accounts for essentially no part of the decline in output below trend
at the trough of the recession. When we introduce a modest amount of investment adjust-
ment costs, the intertemporal wedge accounts for a substantial 34 percent of the drop in
output at the trough of the recession.3 We then consider an alternative speciﬁcation of the
intertemporal wedge which is at least as plausible as the one CKM work with. CKM deﬁne
the intertemporal wedge as an ad valorem tax on the price of investment goods. We argue
that the CF and BGG models motivate considering an alternative formulation in which the
1This strategy is closely related to that advocated in Parkin (1988), Ingram, Kocherlakota and Savin
(1994), Hall (1997), and Mulligan (2002).
2The last variable includes government consumption and net exports.
3Our adjustment costs are ‘modest’ in two senses. First, they imply a steady state elasticity of the
investment-capital ratio to the price of capital equal to unity. This lies in the middle of the range of
empirical estimates reported in the literature. Second, the adjustment cost function has the property that
the quantity of resources lost due to investment adjustment costs is small, even in the wake of the enormous
decline in investment in the early 1930s (see section 4 below for a detailed discussion).
2wedge is modeled as a tax on the gross rate of return on capital. When we work with this al-
ternative formulation, the intertemporal wedge accounts for 26 percent of the drop in output
at the trough of the 1982 recession. But, when we also drop CKM’s model of measurement
error, that quantity jumps to 52 percent. Notably, the CKM model of measurement error is
overwhelmingly rejected in the post war US data. So, BCA actually places a range of 0 to
52 percent on the fraction of the drop in output accounted for by the intertemporal wedge in
the 1982 recession. This range is suﬃciently wide to comfortably include most views about
the importance of the intertemporal wedge.
We show that, at a qualitative level, economic theory predicts the lack of robustness in
BCA that we ﬁnd. The intertemporal wedge associated with diﬀerent perturbations of the
RBC model represent diﬀerent ways of bundling the fundamental economic shocks to the
economy. As a result, the BCA experiment of feeding measured wedges to an RBC model
represents fundamentally diﬀerent economic experiments under alternative speciﬁcations of
the RBC model. Since the experiments are diﬀerent, the outcomes are expected to be
diﬀerent too. Our results show that these expected diﬀerences are quantitatively large enough
to overturn CKM’s conclusions.
Second, CKM’s analysis ignores that the ﬁnancial shocks which drive the intertemporal
wedge may have spillover eﬀects onto other wedges.4 It is not possible to determine the
magnitude of these eﬀects with BCA, because BCA leaves the fundamental shocks to the
economy unidentiﬁed. In fact, the VAR for the wedges estimated under BCA is consistent
with a wide range of possible spillover patterns. In terms of CKM’s conclusion (i) above,
we show that the ﬁnancial shocks which drive the intertemporal wedge could account for
as much as 70-100 percent of reductions in output in US recessions, including the Great
Depression. We obtain the same ﬁnding for several other countries in the OECD. Regarding
CKM’s conclusion (ii), we show that once spillover eﬀects are taken into account, ﬁnancial
shocks which drive the intertemporal wedge can drive consumption and investment in the
same direction.
CKM understand that the fundamental economic shocks are not identiﬁed under BCA.
However, the implications they draw from this observation are very diﬀerent from the ones
we draw. They say, ‘Our method is not intended to identify the primitive sources of shocks.
Rather, it is intended to help understand the mechanisms through which such shocks lead to
economic ﬂuctuations.’5 We ﬁnd that, without the ability to identify the economic shocks,
a potentially important part of the mechanism by which these shocks aﬀect the economy -
the spillover eﬀects - is also not identiﬁed. In eﬀect, BCA oﬀers a menu of observationally
equivalent assessments about the importance of shocks to the intertemporal wedge. By
focusing exclusively on the extreme case of zero spillovers, CKM select the element in the
menu which minimizes the role of intertemporal shocks. We show that there are other
elements in that menu which assign a very large role to intertemporal shocks.
4Recent developments in economic modeling suggest a variety of mechanisms by which these spillover
eﬀects can occur. For example, it is known that in models with Calvo-style wage-setting frictions (see,
e.g., Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000)), a shock outside the labor market can trigger what looks like a
preference shock for labor, or a ‘labor wedge’. Similarly, variable capital utilization can have the eﬀect that
a non-technology shock triggers a move in measured TFP, or the ‘eﬃciency wedge’.
5The quote is taken from the CKM introduction. It summarizes CKM’s comments in section 3 of their
paper.
3Following is an outline of the paper. In the following section, we describe the model used
in the analysis. In section 3, we elaborate on the observational equivalence results discussed
above. In section 4, we discuss our model solution and estimation strategy. In section 5 we
discuss the lack of identiﬁcation of spillover eﬀects in BCA. In section 6 we discuss the wedge
decomposition under BCA and our modiﬁcation to take into account spillovers. Section 7
displays the results of implementing BCA on various data sets. Concluding remarks appear
in section 8. Additional technical details appear in three Appendices.
2. The Model and the Wedges
This section describes the model used in the analysis. In addition, we discuss the wedges
and, in particular, our two speciﬁcations of the intertemporal wedge.




(β (1 + gn))
t [logct + ψlog(1 − lt)], 0 <β<1,
where ct and lt denote per capita consumption and employment, respectively. Also, gn is the
population growth rate and ψ>0 is a parameter. The household budget constraint is
ct +( 1+τx,t)xt ≤ rtkt +( 1− τl,t)wtlt + Tt,
where Tt denotes lump sum taxes, xt denotes investment and τl,t denotes the labor wedge.
Here, kt denotes the beginning-of-period t stock of capital divided by the period t population.
The variable, τx,t, is CKM’s speciﬁcation of the intertemporal wedge. The technology for
capital accumulation is given by:






where Φ(ζ) is symmetric about ζ = b, where b is the steady state investment-capital ratio. In
addition, to ensure that Φ has no impact on steady state, we suppose that Φ(b)=Φ0 (b)=0 .
The household maximizes utility by choice of {ct,k t+1,l t,x t}, subject to its budget con-
straint, the capital evolution equation, the laws of motion of the wedges and the usual
inequality constraints and no-Ponzi scheme condition.
The resource constraint is:





Zt = ˜ Zt (1 + gz)
t ,
and ˜ Zt, the ‘eﬃciency’ wedge, is an exogenous stationary stochastic process. In the resource
constraint, gt denotes government purchases of goods and services plus net exports, which
is assumed to have the following trend property:
gt =˜ gt (1 + gz)
t ,
4where ˜ gt is a stationary, exogenous stochastic process and gz ≥ 0.
Combining ﬁrm and household ﬁrst order necessary conditions for optimization in the
case Φ =0 ,
−ul,t
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where uc,t and −ul,t are the derivatives of period utility with respect to consumption
and leisure, respectively. In addition, yl,t and yk,t are the marginal products of labor and








The equilibrium values of {ct,k t+1,l t,x t} are computed by solving (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4),
subject to the transversality condition and the following law of motion for the exogenous
shocks:













0 = V, (2.6)
where P0 is the 4 × 1 vector of unconditional means for st and
P =








Here, P is stationary and ¯ P is not otherwise restricted. The symmetric matrix, V, in (2.6)
must satisfy the zero restrictions implicit in QQ0 = V, and the zeros in the lower diagonal
part of Q in (2.7). We follow CKM in implementing the zero restrictions in our analysis
of the US Great Depression. We do this in our analysis of OECD countries as well. In
our analysis of postwar US data, we allow all elements of P and all elements in the lower
triangular part of Q to be non-zero. The parameters of (2.6) are P0,P ,and V, possibly with
the indicated zero restrictions on V and the zero and stationarity restrictions on P.
We consider an alternative speciﬁcation of the intertemporal wedge. Our speciﬁcation is
motivated by our analysis of the version of the CF model with adjustment costs and by our
analysis of BGG. In Appendix A, we derive equilibrium conditions for a version of the CF
model with Φ 6=0 . We establish a proposition displaying a set of wedges which, if added
to the RBC economy, ensure that the equilibrium allocations of the RBC economy coincide
with those of our version of the CF economy with investment adjustment costs. We show































Note that in the alternative formulation, the wedge is a tax on the gross return to capital, in
contrast to CKM’s value-added tax on investment purchases, τx,t. In Appendix A we show
that the CF model with adjustment costs implies τk
t+1 is a function of uncertainty realized
at date t, but not at date t +1 .6 We follow CKM in presuming that all wedges implied by
the CF ﬁnancial frictions apart from the intertemporal wedge, 1 − τk
t+1, are quantitatively
small and can be ignored.
In Appendix B we derive the intertemporal wedge associated with the BGG model. That
model also implies that the intertemporal wedge enters as 1−τk
t+1 in (2.8). The only diﬀerence
is that under BGG, τk
t+1 is a function of the period t +1realization of uncertainty.7
In our alternative speciﬁcation of the intertemporal wedge, we allow τk
t to respond to
current and past information. This assumption encompasses both the CF and BGG ﬁnancial
friction models, since the econometric estimation is free to produce a τk
t whose response to
current information is very small.
3. General Observations on the Robustness of BCA to Modeling
Details
In later sections, we show that the conclusions of BCA for the importance of the intertem-
poral wedge are not robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the intertemporal wedge, and to
alternative speciﬁcations of investment adjustment costs. This ﬁnding may at ﬁrst seem puz-
zling in light of a type of observational equivalence result emphasized in CKM. An example
of this type of result which occurs when BCA is done with a linearly approximated RBC
model is the following. Consider an RBC economy with, say, no investment adjustment costs
(i.e., Φ =0 ) and a particular time series representation for the wedges. After introducing
adjustment costs (i.e., Φ 6=0 ), one can ﬁnd a new representation of the intertemporal wedge
which ensures that the equilibria of the economies with and without adjustment costs coin-
cide.8 This is an observational equivalence result because it implies that the likelihood of a
6That appendix provides a careful derivation of our result, because our ﬁnding for the way the intertem-
poral wedge enters (2.8) diﬀers from CKM’s ﬁnding. CKM consider the case, Φ =0 , in deriving the wedge
representation of the CF model. The results for the Φ =0and Φ 6=0cases are qualitatively diﬀerent.
When Φ =0capital producers simply produce increments to the capital stock, which capital owners add
to the existing undepreciated capital by themselves. When Φ 6=0 , old capital is a fundamental input in
the production of new capital. In this case, we assume that the capital producers must purchase the econ-
omy’s entire stock of capital in order to produce new capital, so that their ﬁnancing requirements and the
associated frictions are diﬀerent. There are perhaps other ways of arranging the production of new installed
capital when Φ 6=0 . We ﬁnd our way convenient because it results in an intertemporal wedge that virtually
coincides with the one we derive for BGG
7CKM derive the intertemporal wedge for a version of the BGG model in which banks have access to
complete state-contingent markets. Our wedge formula applies to the model analyzed in BGG, which does
n o tp e r m i tc o m p l e t em a r k e t s .
8Here, we make use of our asumption that analysis is done using log-linear approximation. In this case,
the only eﬀect of the change in Φ is to change the rate of return on capital. For example, in the linear
6set of allocations is invariant to the presence of adjustment costs. This case of adjustment
c o s t si sj u s te x a m p l eo ft h et y p eo fo b s e r v a t i o n a le q u i v a l e n c er e s u l tw eh a v ei nm i n d . F o r
example, consider an RBC economy in which the intertemporal wedge is of the τx,t type
emphasized by CKM. Given a speciﬁcation of the joint time series representation of τx,t and
the other wedges, the τx,t RBC model implies a set of equilibrium allocations. Now consider
an alternative RBC economy in which the intertemporal wedge is of the τk
t type. There
exists a speciﬁcation of the joint stochastic process for τk
t and the other wedges having the
property that the equilibrium allocations in the τk
t RBC model coincide with those in the τx,t
RBC model. Again, this stochastic process is identiﬁed from the requirement that the after
tax rates of return in the two economies coincide. In both of the above examples, it is clear
that the observational equivalence result depends on the assumption that the time series
representations used for the shocks are suﬃciently ﬂexible to accommodate any speciﬁcation
for the stochastic process of the wedges.9
We wish to stress here that the equilibrium observational equivalence result does not
imply a ‘BCA robustness result’. In particular, the outcome of BCA (i.e., the outcome of
feeding ﬁtted wedges, one at a time, to a model) is not expected to be robust to the speciﬁ-
cation of investment adjustment costs, or to whether the intertemporal wedge is modeled as
τx,t or τk
t. There are two reasons for this lack of robustness. One is practical and reﬂects that
the analyst must conﬁne him/herself to a speciﬁc parametric time series representation of
the wedges, thus potentially ruling out one of the conditions of the observational equivalence
result. The other, deeper, reason is the one mentioned in the introduction. Even if the
a n a l y s tu s e sac o m p l e t e l yﬂexible time series representation of the wedges, the intertemporal
wedge represents a diﬀerent bundle of fundamental shocks under alternative perturbations
of the model. Feeding the measured intertemporal wedge to an RBC model under alterna-
tive model perturbations represents a diﬀerent experiment and so is expected to produce a
diﬀerent outcome.
To illustrate these observations, suppose the data are generated by an RBC model in
which intertemporal wedge is the τk
t t y p e ,w i t hac e r t a i ns p e c i ﬁcation of the adjustment cost
function, Φ. The joint time series representation of the wedges is given by (2.6), in which P
and Q are diagonal. Thus, each wedge is uncorrelated with all other wedges, at all leads and
lags. In this case, BCA has a clear interpretation: when the estimated intertemporal wedge
is fed to the baseline RBC model, the simulations display the model’s response to a particular
history of past innovations to that wedge alone. Suppose the econometrician is provided with
an inﬁnite amount of data, but misspeciﬁes the adjustment cost function, Φ. As in BCA,
the econometrician only estimates the joint time series representation of the wedges, and
holds the misspeciﬁed Φ and other nonstochastic parts of the economy ﬁxed. We assume
that the econometrician’s time series representation for the wedges is suﬃciently ﬂexible
to encompass the quasi-true time series of the wedges that is implied by the observational
equivalence result. We obtain insight into BCA by deriving that time series representation.
The requirement that the after tax rates of return in the econometrician’s model coincide
approximation the law of motion for the capital stock, (2.1), is always linear and invariant to a.
9This is a special case of a well-known result that econometric identiﬁcation often hinges on having
suﬃcient restrictions on the unobserved shocks.
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Here, a − over a variable indicates the value of the variable in the true model and absence of
a − indicates the value estimated by the econometrician who misspeciﬁes Φ. The endogenous
variables on the right side of the equality in (3.1) are speciﬁc functions of the history of the
innovations driving the wedges in the actual economy. Then, according to (3.1), the adjusted
time series representation of τk
t is the convolution of these functions with the function on
the right of the equality in (3.1). We derive this map from the fundamental innovations in
the economy to τk
t using linearization.
Consider the true speciﬁcation of Φ and the true joint time series representation of the
wedges, st, given in (2.6). Let zt denote the list of endogenous variables in the model, i.e.,
zt =( ct,x t,k t+1,l t,τk
t), where the quantity variables are measured in log deviations from
steady state and τk
t is in deviation from steady state. The equilibrium conditions of zt may
be written in the form:
Et [α0zt+1 + α1zt + α2zt−1 + β0st+1 + β1st]=0 , with st = Pst−1 + Qεt.
Here, st =
³
log ˜ Zt,τl,t,¯ τk
t,log ˜ gt
´0
. The expectational diﬀerence equation is composed of
the intertemporal ﬁrst order condition (2.8), the intratemporal ﬁrst order condition (2.3),
the law of motion for capital (2.1), the resource constraint, (2.2), and the mapping from
¯ τk
t to τk
t, (3.1), all after suitable log-linearization. The solution to this system is written
zt = Azt−1 + Bst, or, when expressed in moving average form10:
zt =[ I − AL]
−1 B [I − PL]
−1 Qεt.
Let τ denote the 5-dimensional column vector with all zeros, except a 1 in the 5th location.




t = τ [I − AL]
−1 B [I − PL]
−1 Qεt.
This is the convolution of (3.1) with the time series representation of the (linearized) vari-
ables in (3.1). Let ν denote the 3 by 4 matrix constructed by deleting the third row of
the 4-dimensional identity matrix and let St denote the 3 dimensional vector obtained by
deleting ¯ τk
t from st. We conclude that the econometrician who misspeciﬁes Φ will estimate




















a moving average component. To see this, it is useful to examine the iid case, P =0and
10For further discussion, see Christiano (2002).
8Q = I. Note ﬁrst that τ [I − A]
−1 B has the following form:
τ [I − A]
−1 B = τ
⎡
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Note that the intertemporal wedge has a pure, ﬁrst order moving average representation,
even though τk
t in the correctly speciﬁed economy is iid and a function only of the third
element of εt. Evidently, the wedges in the misspeciﬁed economy do not obey the same ﬁrst
order VAR(1) representation that st does. Thus, the analyst who is restricted VAR(1) (or,
VAR(q), q<∞) representations for the wedges misrepresents the reduced form of the data.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the conclusions of BCA will be diﬀerent,
across diﬀerent speciﬁcations of Φ.
Now, suppose that the analyst adopts a suﬃciently ﬂexible time series representation
of the wedges, so that the speciﬁcation error described in the previous paragraph does not
occur. The intertemporal wedge, ¯ τk
t, computed by the econometrician working with the
correct speciﬁcation of Φ is a function of just the current realization of the third element of
εt. In the alternative speciﬁcation, τk
t is a function of the entire history of all elements of εt.
Clearly, feeding the estimated intertemporal wedge to the model is a diﬀerent experiment
across the two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of Φ. This is why we do not expect the results of BCA
to be robust to perturbations in the RBC model.
4. Model Solution and Estimation
Here, we describe how we assigned values to the model parameters. A subset of the para-
meters were not estimated. These were set as in CKM:
β =1 /1.03,α =0 .35,δ=0 .0464,ψ=2 .24, (4.1)
gn =0 .015,g z =0 .016.
Here, β, δ, gn, and gz are expressed at annual rates. These are suitably adjusted when we
analyze quarterly data. The ﬁrst subsection below discusses the estimation of the parameters
of the exogenous shocks, P0,P ,and V, using data on output, consumption, investment and
9government consumption plus net exports. Estimation is carried out conditional on a para-
meterization of the adjustment cost function. The parameterization of the adjustment cost
function is discussed in the second subsection. The third subsection rebuts some criticisms
of the investment adjustment cost function expressed in CKM. Their criticisms suggest that
investment adjustment costs are, in eﬀect, a ‘nonstarter’. Since they are not empirically in-
teresting, they therefore do not constitute a compelling basis for criticizing BCA. We explain
why we disagree with this assessment.
4.1. Estimating the Parameters of the Time Series Representation of the Wedges
For the US Great Depression, we used annual data covering the period, 1901-1940.11 Quar-
terly data covering the period 1959Q1-2004Q3 were used for the US and quarterly data over
various periods were used on 14 other OECD countries.12 Following CKM, the elements of
the matrices, P and V are estimated subject to the zero restrictions described in section 2,
and to the restriction that the maximal eigenvalue of P not exceed 0.995.
The ﬁrst step of estimation is to set up the model’s solution in state space - observer
form:












t = R, Eutu
0
t = V,







where ˜ kt = kt/(1 + gz)












where ˜ xt = xt/(1 + gz)
t . Finally, υt is a 4 × 1 vector of measurement errors, with
R =0 .0001 × I4, (4.6)
where I4 is the four-dimensional identity matrix and CKM set the scale factor exogenously
(see CKM (technical appendix, page 16)). We refer to this speciﬁcation of R as the ‘CKM
11These data were taken from CKM, as supplied on Ellen McGrattan’s web site.
12US data are the data associated with the CKM project, and were taken from Ellen McGrattan’s web
page. With two exceptions, data for other OECD countries were taken from Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2002), also on Ellen McGrattan’s web site. Data on hours worked were taken from the OECD productivity
database. These data are annual and were converted to quarterly by log-linear interpolation. Population
data were taken from the OECD national databases and log-linearly intertpolated to quarterly.
10measurement error assumption’. We repeat the analysis under CKM measurement error, as
well as with R =0 .
As noted in the introduction, the CKM speciﬁcation of measurement error has an impact
on the analysis. CKM do not explain why they include measurement error, nor do they
discuss the a priori evidence which leads them to the speciﬁc values they choose for the
measurement error variance.13 We do have reason to believe the data are measured with
error. However, we know of no reason to take seriously the notion that CKM’s speciﬁcation
even approximately captures actual data measurement error.14
We implement BCA using ﬁrst and second-order approximations to the model’s equilib-
rium conditions. Consider the ﬁrst order approximation. In this case, the representation of
the policy rule is:
log˜ kt+1 =( 1− λ)λ0 + λlog ˜ kt + ψst, (4.7)
where λ0 and λ are scalars and ψ is a 1 × 4 row vector. Then, (4.2)-(4.3) can be written:












where F0 is a 5 × 1 column vector, and F1 is a 5 × 5 matrix. Also,
Yt = H0 + H1ξt + υt, (4.8)
where H0 is a 4 × 1 column vector and H1 is a 4 × 4 matrix. The Gaussian likelihood is
constructed using F0,F 1,H 0,H 1,V ,R ,and Y =( Y1,...,YT) (see Hamilton (1994)). These
in turn can be constructed using γ, R. Thus, the likelihood can be expressed as L(Y |γ;R).
For the nonlinear case, we use the algorithm in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) to obtain
second order approximations to the functions, F and H in (4.2) and (4.3). It is easy to see
that even if ut is Normally distributed, Yt will not be Normal in this nonlinear system.
We nevertheless proceed to form the Gaussian density function using the unscented ﬁlter
described in Wan and van der Merwe (2001). It is known that under certain conditions,
Gaussian maximum likelihood estimation has the usual desirable properties, even when the
data are not Gaussian.
4.2. Investment Adjustment Costs
To analyze the version of the model with adjustment costs, we must parameterize the in-
vestment adjustment cost function, Φ. Our calibration is based on our interpretation of the
variable, Pk0,t. On this dimension, the CF and BGG models diﬀer slightly (for details, see
Appendices A and B). Both agree that Pk0,t is the marginal cost, in units of consumption
13As already noted, other parameter values are also ﬁxed in the analysis, such as production function
parameters. Dogmatic priors like this can perhaps be justiﬁed by appealing to analyses based on other data,
such as observations on income shares. We are not aware of any such argument, however, that can be used
as a basis for adopting the dogmatic priors in (4.6).
14Based on what we know about the way data are collected, there is strong a priori reason to question the
CKM model of measurement error. For a careful discussion, see Sargent (1989).
11goods, of producing new capital when only (2.1) is considered.15 However, in the CF model,
ﬁnancial frictions introduce a wedge between the market price of capital and Pk0,t. Still, in
practice the discrepancy between Pk0,t and the market price of new capital in the CF model
with adjustment costs may be quantitatively small. To see this, it is instructive to consider
t h er e s p o n s eo ft h ev a r i a b l e si nt h eC Fm o d e l( w h e r ePk0,t =1always) to a technology shock.
According to CF (see Figure 2 in CF), the contemporaneous response of the market price
of capital is only one-tenth the contemporaneous response of investment. That simulation
suggests that the distinction between Pk0,t and the market price of capital may not be large
i nt h eC Fm o d e l .
In the BGG model, ﬁnancial frictions arise inside the relationship between the managers
of capital and banks, and so the frictions do not open wedge between the marginal cost of
capital and Pk0,t. As a consequence, Pk0,t corresponds to the market price of capital in the
BGG model.
Under the interpretation of Pk0,t as the market price of capital, we can calibrate Φ based
on empirical estimates of the elasticity of investment with respect to the price of capital (i.e.,







According to estimates reported in Abel (1980) and Eberly (1997), Tobin’s q lies in a range
of 0.6 to 1.4. Interestingly, if we just consider the period of largest fall in the Dow Jones
Industrial average during the Great Depression, 1929Q4 to 1932Q4, the ratio of the percent
change in investment to the percent change in the Dow is 0.68.16 This is an estimate of
Tobin’s q under the assumption that the movement in the Dow reﬂects primarily the price
of capital, and not its quantity.17 This estimate lies in the middle of the Abel-Eberly range
of estimates. A unit Tobin’s q elasticity implies Φ00 (b)=1 /b.
Another factor impacting on our choice of Φ00 (b) is the model’s implication for the rate
of return on capital, Rk. Figure 1A shows the results corresponding to Tobin’s q elasticities
1/2, 1, 3a n d∞ (the latter corresponds to Φ00 (b)=0 ) . For each elasticity, the model
was estimated using the linearization strategy and using quarterly US data covering the
period 1959QIV-2003QI. For these calculations, the only feature of Φ that is required is the
value of Φ00 (b). The model-based estimate of Rk
t, (2.9), was computed using the two-sided
Kalman smoother.18 The US data on Rk
t were constructed using Robert Shiller’s data on
real dividends and real stock prices for the S&P composite index. In the case of both model-
based and actual Rk
t, we report centered, equally weighted, 5 quarter moving averages. Note
that without adjustment costs, the model drastically understates the volatility in Rk
t. With
15It is easy to verify that Pk0,t in (2.1) corresponds to the price of investment goods (i.e., unity) divided
by the marginal product of investment goods in producing end of period capital.
16This is the ratio of the log diﬀerence in investment to the log diﬀerence in the Dow, over the period
indicated. Both variables were in nominal terms.
17By associating the model’s capital stock with what is priced in the Dow, we are implicitly taking the
position that capital in the model corresponds to both tangible and intangible capital.
18See Hamilton (1994) for a discussion. The two-sided smoother is required because we do not use empirical
data on the capital stock, which is an input in (2.9). Presumably, the smoother estimates the capital stock
by combining the investment data with the capital accumulation equation.
12aT o b i n ’ sq elasticity of 3 (i.e., Φ00 (b)=1 /(3b)) the model still substantially understates
that volatility. With an elasticity around unity, the model begins to reproduce the volatility
of Rk, though it is still somewhat low. Only with an elasticity around 1/2 does the model
nearly replicate the volatility of Rk. These results reinforce our impression that the data
suggest a Tobin’s q elasticity of unity or less. To be conservative, we work with an elasticity
of unity.
4.3. Responding to CKM’s Criticisms About Adjustment Costs
CKM criticize the use of adjustment costs with a unit Tobin’s q elasticity for two reasons.
According to their ﬁrst critique, adjustment costs with a unit Tobin’s q elasticity imply
that an unreasonably large amount of resources are absorbed by adjustment costs during
collapse of investment in the Great Depression. This conclusion is based on the arbitrary
assumption that the adjustment cost function, Φ, is globally quadratic. But, we show that
other functional forms for Φ can be found with the property, Φ00 (b)=1 /b, whose global
properties do not imply that an inordinate amount of resources were used up in investment
adjustment costs in the Great Depression. Second, CKM assert that an adjustment cost
formulation which implies a static relationship between the investment-capital ratio and
Tobin’s q is empirically implausible. But, we show that BCA lacks robustness even with
the speciﬁcation of adjustment costs proposed in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2004),
which does not imply a static relationship the investment-capital ratio and Tobin’s q. This
adjustment cost function, in which adjustment costs are a function of the change in the ﬂow
of investment, also does not imply that an inordinate amount of resources were used up in
adjustment costs during the collapse of investment in the 1930s.19















so that Φ00(b)=a. Imposing that Tobin’s q elasticity is unity, the resources lost to adjustment













a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 . 1 ) . H e r e ,x/y is the steady state investment to output ratio. In (4.10),
we have used x = bk in the steady state. Here, λt is the time t investment-capital ratio,
expressed as a ratio to its steady state value, b. Also, µt is the output-capital ratio, expressed
as a ratio to its steady state value, y/k. Figure 6 indicates that output was 10 percent below
trend in 1930, and then fell another 10 percent in each of 1931 and 1932. In 1933, the trough
of the Depression, it fell yet another 5 percent, so that by 1933 output was a full 35 percent
19This adjustment cost function has the additional advantage that it receives empirical support from the
analysis of housing investment (see Rosen and Topel (1988)) and aggregate Tobin’s q data (see Matsuyama
(1984)), in addition to the empirical evidence in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2006). Also, this
adjustment cost formulation has economically interesting microfoundations, as shown in Lucca (2006) and
Matsuyama (1984).
13below trend. The drop in investment was even more dramatic. In 1930, 1931, 1932 and
1933 it was about 30, 50, 70 and 70 percent below trend, respectively. Using our capital
accumulation equation, we infer that the stock of capital was 10 percent below trend in 1933.
Since investment was 70 percent below its trend in 1933 and the capital stock was 10
percent its trend then, we infer that the investment to capital ratio is 60 percent below steady
state, i.e., λ1933 =0 .40. Output was 35 percent below steady state in 1933, and we infer that











2 (0.23)/0.75 = 0.055,
or 5.5 percent. Given that output was 35 percent below trend in 1933, the implication is that
16 percent of the drop in output reﬂected resources lost to adjustment costs associated with
the low level of investment. To see how sensitive this conclusion is to the choice of functional
form for Φ, consider Figure 1B, which graphs (4.10) for 100λt ranging from 40 percent to
160 percent, holding x/(yµt) ﬁxed at 0.31. Note how the quadratic curve hits the vertical
axis at 5.5 percent. The other curve in Figure 1B coincides with the quadratic function
for λt roughly in its range for postwar business cycles. Outside this range, the alternative
function is ﬂatter than the quadratic, and it hits the vertical axis at 2.5 percent. The
alternative adjustment cost function has a much more modest implication for the amount
of resources lost to adjustment costs as investment collapsed in the Great Depression. Yet,
the implications of the model with the alternative adjustment cost function for postwar
business cycles coincides with the implications of the model with the quadratic adjustment
cost function.20
To address CKM’s second concern about adjustment costs, we also considered the fol-
lowing formulation:











With this formulation of adjustment costs, investment responds diﬀerently to permanent
and temporary changes in the price of capital. This addresses one of CKM’s concerns about
investment adjustment costs. To address the other concern, we needed to assign a value to
a. For this, we estimated the parameters of the joint time series representation of the wedges
for various values of a, using postwar US data. We found that with a =3 .75 the model’s
implications for the volatility of the rate of return on capital virtually coincides with the
implications of our baseline model with a unit Tobin’s q elasticity. We then used the Balke
and Gordon quarterly data on investment and output in the 1930s to compute the fraction
of output lost due to adjustment as investment plunged at the start of the Great Depression.
We found that the largest fraction of output lost due to adjustment costs in the period
1929Q1-1933Q1 was 1.46 percent. According to the Balke and Gordon data, investment
20The alternative adjustment cost function is a 10th degree polynomial, and so it has a continuous derivative
of every order. It was constructed as follows. We constructed a ‘target’ function by splicing the quadratic
function in the range, λ ∈ (0.85,1.15), with straight lines on either end. The straight lines have slope equal
to that of the quadratic function at the point where they meet. The 10th degree polynomial was ﬁtb y
standard Chebyshev interpolation.
14rose sharply starting in 1933Q2. Adjustment costs were larger then, but adjustment costs in
expansions are less of a concern to CKM.21 We conclude that with the alternative adjustment
costs, neither of CKM’s two objections apply.
Signiﬁcantly, our ﬁnding that BCA is sensitive to the presence of adjustment costs is
also true when the adjustment costs are in terms of the change in investment. Ignoring the
spillover eﬀects between wedges, as CKM do, we calculated the percent of the fall in output
due to the intertemporal wedge at the trough of ﬁve postwar US recessions. For the 1970,
1974, 1980, 1990 and 2000 recessions, the percentages are 17, 30, 14, 26, and 43, respectively.
All these are substantial amounts and certainly do not warrant the CKM conclusion that
ﬁnancial frictions which manifest themselves primarily in the intertemporal wedge are not
worth pursuing.
5. Identiﬁcation, the Importance of Financial Frictions and BCA
In the introduction we discussed the sense in which the importance of ﬁnancial frictions is
not identiﬁed under BCA. We explain this here. We describe a statistic which we use to
characterize the importance of ﬁnancial frictions. We show that a range of values for this
statistic is consistent with the same value of the likelihood function.
U n t i ln o w ,t h eb a s i cs h o c k sd r i v i n gt h es y s t e mh a v eb e e nut in (2.6). The interactions
among these shocks are left almost completely unrestricted under BCA. In part, this is
because the ut’s are found to be highly correlated in practice. This correlation is assumed to
reﬂect that the elements of ut are overlapping combinations of diﬀerent fundamental economic
shocks. Because fundamental economic shocks are assumed to be primitive and to have
separate origins, they are often assumed to be uncorrelated. We make this uncorrelatedness
assumption here. Denote the 5×1 vector of fundamental economic shocks by et. We normalize
their variances to unity, so that Eete0
t = I. We assume that the fundamental shocks are
related to the ut’s by the following invertible relationship:
ut = Cet,E e te
0
t = I, CC
0 = V, (5.1)
where C has the structure of Q in (2.7).22 It is well known that even with a particular
estimate of V in hand, there are many C’s that satisfy CC0 = V . Alternative speciﬁcations
of C that preserve the property, CC0 = V, are observationally equivalent with respect to a
set of observations, Y =( Y1,...,Y T). Because this property plays a key role in our analysis,
it is useful to state it as a proposition:
21According to Balke and Gordon’s data, per capita real investment, including durable goods, (1929
dollars), was 44, 65, 119, and 83 in the ﬁrst to fourth quarters of 1933. Our estimate of the percent of
aggregate output lost to adjustment costs is 0.77, 3.09, 17.04, and 1.69 for each of the four quarters in 1933.
The number for 1933Q3 is very large. However, we note that it is generated by a rise in investment, not a
fall. In addition, we are suspicious that investment rose 83 percent in 1933Q3 and then fell about 30 percent
in 1933Q4. This sharp volatility is consistent with the possibility that measurement error overstated the
level of invesment in 1933Q3.
22We are assuming that the fundamental economic shocks can be recovered from the space of current and
past shocks. Lippi and Reichlin (1993) challenge this assumption and discuss some of the implications of its
failure. See also Sims and Zha (1996) and Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Sargent (2006).
15Proposition 1. Consider a set of model parameter values, γ =( P,P0,V), with likelihood
value, L(Y |γ;R). Perturbations of C such that CC0 = V have no impact on the likelihood,
L.
Obviously, Proposition 1 applies for both the linear and the nonlinear strategies we use to
approximate the likelihood. Although BCA makes many detailed economic assumptions
(e.g., details about utility and technology), it does not make the assumptions needed to
identify the fundamental economic disturbances, et, to the economy.
We suppose, for the purpose of our discussion, that the third element in et corresponds
to the ﬁnancial frictions shock which originates in the intertemporal wedge, which is the
third element of st.23 To discuss the diﬃculty of pinning down the importance of ﬁnancial
frictions, it is useful to develop a constructive characterization of the family of C’s that
satisfy (5.1).24 Write
C = ¯ CW, (5.2)
where W is any orthonormal matrix and ¯ C is the unique lower diagonal matrix with non-
negative diagonal elements having the property that ¯ C ¯ C0 = V .A l t h o u g he a c hC in (5.2) is
observationally equivalent by Proposition 1, each C implies a diﬀerent et. To see this, note



















where g =( cf −de)/b. It is easy to verify that W is orthonormal for each θ =( a,b,c,d,e,f).
For a ﬁxed set of observed ut,t=1 ,...,T, there is a diﬀerent sequence, et,t=1 ,...,T,
associated with almost all θ ∈ R6. According to Proposition 1, the likelihood of the data
based on the linear approximation is constant with respect to variations in θ.
We are now in a position to describe our measure of the importance of ﬁnancial frictions.
This measure combines the two mechanisms by which ﬁnancial frictions can matter. The ﬁrst
is that ﬁnancial frictions represent a source of shocks (see Figure 2). For us, the stand-in for
these shocks is e3t. These operate on the economy by driving the intertemporal wedge, s3t, (see
(i) in Figure 2) and through spillover eﬀects onto other wedges ((iii) in Figure 2). The second
mechanism reﬂects that ﬁnancial frictions modify the way non-ﬁnancial friction shocks, e1t,
e2t,e 4t,a ﬀect the economy. They do so by inducing movements in the intertemporal wedge
(see (ii) in Figure 2). Our measure of the importance of ﬁnancial frictions is the ratio of what
the variance of HP-ﬁltered output would be if only the ﬁnancial frictions were operative, to
23In an agency cost model, these shocks could be perturbations to the variance of idiosyncratic disturbances
aﬀecting entrepreneurs, or to the survival rate of entrepreneurs. See Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004,
2006) for examples.
24Here, we follow the strategy pursued in Uhlig (2002).
16the total variance of HP-ﬁltered output. We construct this formally as follows. The wedges,
st, have the following moving average representation (here, we ignore constant terms):
st =[ I − PL]
−1 Qεt = F(L)εt,
say. Deﬁne
˜ st = ˜ F (L)εt.
Here, ˜ F (L) denotes the version of F (L) in which all elements have been set to zero, except
those in the third column and the third row (i.e., ˜ F (L) is F (L) with the (i,j) elements
set to zero, for i,j =1 ,2,4.) The dynamics of ˜ st reﬂect the mechanisms by which the
ﬁnancial frictions aﬀect the wedges. The fact that the 3,3 element of F(L) is kept in ˜ F (L)
means that the ﬁnancial friction shock is permitted to exert its eﬀect on the intertemporal
wedge, s3t. The fact that we keep the other elements of the third column of F (L) means
that we include in ˜ F (L) the spillover eﬀects from the ﬁnancial friction shock to the other
wedges. Regarding the other elements of εt, ˜ F (L) only includes their spillover eﬀects onto
the intertemporal wedge. This is our way of capturing the notion that ﬁnancial frictions
modify the transmission of non-ﬁnancial shocks. Although ˜ st represents the component of
st corresponding to ﬁnancial frictions, it is important to bear in mind that it is not an
orthogonal decomposition of st.25 F o re x a m p l e ,i ti sp o s s i b l ef o rt h ev a r i a n c eo f˜ st to exceed
that of st.
Write (4.7) in lag operator form:




and express the linearized observer equation, (4.8), as follows:
Yt = h0st + h1 log ˜ kt + υt
where h0 is a 4 × 4 matrix and h1 is a 4 × 1 column vector. Then,






The representation of Yt that reﬂects only the ﬁnancial frictions is denoted ˜ Yt, and is as
follows:
˜ Yt = H(L) ˜ F (L)εt + υt. (5.4)
























25That is, ˜ st and st − ˜ st are correlated. Since var(st)=var(˜ st)+var(st − ˜ st)+2 cov (˜ s,st − ˜ st), it is
possible for var(˜ st) >v a r(st) if the covariance term is suﬃciently negative.


















T h ev a r i a n c eo f˜ Yt, ˜ C0, c a nb ec o m p u t e di na na n a l o g o u sw a y .
Our measure of the importance of ﬁnancial frictions, f, is the 1,1 element of ˜ C0, which
we denote ˜ C11







Since it is a ratio of variances, f must be positive. However, because (5.5) is not based on an
orthogonal decomposition, f may be larger than unity. The importance of ﬁnancial frictions
is not identiﬁed, because almost all perturbations in θ imply diﬀerent values of f, but the
same value of the likelihood, by Proposition 1.
6. Wedge Decompositions
We describe decompositions of the data during a recession which begins in period t = t1
a n de n d si np e r i o dt = t2. CKM’s strategy, which we call the ‘baseline decomposition’, is as
follows. CKM ask how the recession would have unfolded if only the wedge, s3t, evolved as
it did and the other wedges remained constant at their values at the start of the recession.
We ﬁnd the sequence, εt,t= t1,...,t2 which has the property that when this is input into
(2.6), the third element of the simulated st,t= t1,...,t2, coincides with its estimated values
and the other elements of st are ﬁxed at their value at t = t1.
We investigate an alternative strategy for assessing the role of ﬁnancial frictions, which
recognizes the roles played by these frictions discussed in the introduction and in section
5. Such a strategy would choose a value for the rotation parameter, θ and use the implied
sequence of et’s to simulate (5.4). However, because ˜ F is an inﬁnite-ordered moving average
representation, we decided this strategy is impractical and we devised a closely related one
instead. The strategy we implemented (‘rotation decomposition’) recognizes that ﬁnancial
shocks drive both the intertemporal wedge and have spillover eﬀects on other wedges. But,
it does not capture the spillover eﬀects from other shocks onto the intertemporal wedge. In
this sense our rotation decomposition understates the role of ﬁnancial frictions. However,
we mitigate the latter eﬀect by working with the rotation, θ, which maximizes the role of
ﬁnancial frictions, f.
The rotation decomposition is constructed as follows. We compute ut,t= t1,...,t 2, and
the value, θ
∗, of θ ∈ R6 which maximizes f in (5.5). Then, we ﬁx W and compute the
implied sequence, et, for t = t1,...,t2 using (5.3) and the value of C implied by (5.2). Next,
set to zero all but the third element in et. After that, we compute the implied sequence of
disturbances, uθ∗
t ,t= t1,...,t2 using (5.1). Here, the superscript θ
∗ highlights the dependence
on the rotation parameter, θ
∗. For input into our state space - observer system, (4.3)-(4.2),
we require εt. We compute a sequence, εθ∗




This section documents two problems with BCA: conclusions are sensitive to modeling details
and to the position one takes on spillover eﬀects. In the ﬁrst subsection we discuss the results
for US postwar recessions. We then consider postwar recessions in the remaining OECD
countries. Finally, we consider the US in the Great Depression.
7.1. US Postwar Recessions
7.1.1. Sensitivity of Baseline Decomposition to Modeling Details
In our analysis of the post-war US data, we examine ﬁve recessions. The 1982 recession,
which is emphasized in CKM, is highlighted in the text. Details about the other post war US
recessions are provided in Appendix C. Consider Table 1, which presents summary results for
the 1982 US recession. The statistic reported in Table 1 is the fraction of the decline in output
at the recession trough which is accounted for by the intertemporal wedge. The trough of the
recession is deﬁned as the quarter when detrended output achieves its minimum value. Panel
1a displays results based on the CKM speciﬁcation of the intertemporal wedge (i.e., τxt)a n d
Panel 1b displays results for the alternative speciﬁcation (τk
t). In addition, results based on
the baseline and rotation decompositions and with and without investment adjustment costs
are reported. Finally, the table shows the impact of including CKM measurement error at
the estimation stage of computing the wedges.
Turning to the CKM version of the wedge in Panel 1a we see that, regardless of whether
measurement error is included in the analysis, adjustment costs make a substantial diﬀer-
ence. Without investment adjustment costs, the intertemporal wedge contributes essentially
nothing to the decline in output (or investment) in the 1982 recession. With adjustment
costs, the intertemporal wedge accounts for roughly 30 percent of the decline in output at
the trough of that recession. Evidently, adjustment costs have a very large impact on in-
ference. At the same time, the impact of measurement error is nil, when we work with the
CKM version of the intertemporal wedge.
T u r n i n gt ot h ea l t e r n a t i v es p e c i ﬁcation of the intertemporal wedge, in Panel 1b we see
that measurement error now matters a great deal. For example, with no measurement error
and with adjustment costs, the intertemporal wedge accounts for over half the decline in
output at the trough of the 1982 recession. With measurement error, that number falls to
a much smaller (though still substantial!) 22 percent. The ﬁrst column in the table shows
that the CKM measurement error speciﬁcation is strongly rejected by a likelihood ratio test
whether or not adjustment costs are included in the analysis. So, the likelihood directs us
to pay attention to the results without measurement error.
The results in Panel 1b show how much the speciﬁcation of the intertemporal wedge
matters. When CKM measurement error is used and there are no adjustment costs, the
alternative formulation of the intertemporal wedge accounts for a substantial 24 percent of
the drop in output at the trough of the 1982 recession. This stands in sharp contrast with
the nearly zero percent drop implied by the CKM measure of that wedge. Interestingly,
with the alternative measure of the wedge and with CKM measurement error, adjustment
costs matter very little. When we set measurement error to zero (inducing a very large jump
19in the likelihood!) then adjustment costs matter a great deal, even with the alternative
speciﬁcation of the intertemporal wedge.
A more complete representation of our ﬁndings is reported in Figure 3, which displays
results for the baseline decomposition of US data in the 1982 recession. To save space,
Figure 3 reports results only for the alternative speciﬁcation of the intertemporal wedge.
The alternative version of the wedge is of special interest because of its conformity with the
model in BBG.
In Figure 3, the circles indicate the zero line. The line with diamonds indicates the
evolution of the data in response to all the wedges. By construction, the line with diamonds
corresponds to the actual (detrended) data. The line marked with stars indicates the baseline
decomposition when we estimated the model with the CKM speciﬁcation of measurement
error. The left column of graphs indicates results based on setting adjustment costs in
investment to zero (i.e., Φ =0 ) . The right column of graphs indicates results based on setting
adjustment costs in investment to a level which implies a Tobin’s q elasticity of unity. Note
that for results based on estimation using the CKM measurement error speciﬁcation, the
intertemporal wedge accounts for relatively little of the movement in output, investment,
hours worked and consumption. This conclusion is not sensitive to the introduction of
adjustment costs in investment.
The line in Figure 3 indicated by pluses displays results based on estimation with mea-
surement error set to zero. In the left column, we see that if the only wedge that had been
active in the 1982 recession had been the intertemporal wedge, the US economy would have
experienced a substantial boom (this can also be seen in Table 1). Investment would have
been massively above trend, and consumption would have been massively below trend. These
results show how sensitive BCA can be to seemingly minor details. Measurement error is
very small under the CKM measurement error speciﬁcation, yet it has a large impact on the
outcome of BCA.
Measurement error also has a big impact on the assessment of the importance of adjust-
ment costs. Comparing results in the left and right columns of Figure 3, we see that when
measurement error is set to zero in estimation, then adjustment costs make a big diﬀerence to
the assessment of the importance of the intertemporal wedge. The boom in output produced
by the intertemporal wedge in the absence of adjustment costs becomes a recession when
adjustment costs are turned on. As noted above, with adjustment costs the intertemporal
wedge accounts for a very substantial 52 percent of the drop in output at the trough of the
1982 recession.
Results for four other US postwar recessions are presented in the appendix, and they
generally support our ﬁndings for the 1982 recession: BCA results sensitive to the position
taken on measurement error, the speciﬁcation of the intertemporal wedge and on adjustment
costs in investment.
7.1.2. The Potential Importance of Spillovers
The evidence for the 1982 recession in Figure 3 and for the other recession episodes is that
the intertemporal wedge, when it has any impact at all, drives consumption and investment
in opposite directions. At ﬁrst, this may seem damaging to the proposition that shocks
which drive the intertemporal wedge are important in business cycles, because consumption
20and investment are both procyclical in the data. This section shows that the opposite-
signed response of consumption and investment is simply an artifact of ignoring spillover
eﬀects. Once spillover eﬀects are taken into account, the evidence from BCA is consistent
with consumption and investment responding with the same sign to an intertemporal wedge
shock.
We quantify the potential importance of spillover eﬀects by considering our rotation de-
composition, discussed in section 6. Table 1 indicates that the intertemporal wedge accounts
for almost the whole of the 1982 recession under the rotation decomposition, under almost
all model perturbations. The one exception occurs in the case of no measurement error, no
adjustment costs and τk
t intertemporal wedge.
We can see the results more completely for the alternative representation of the wedge,
in Figure 4 (from here on, only results for the alternative representation of the wedge are
presented). The left column of that ﬁgure reproduces the results of CKM’s baseline de-
composition from Figure 3. The right column displays the results based on the rotation
decomposition. All results in Figure 4 are based on setting measurement error to zero.
This is consistent with our remarks above, according to which CKM’s measurement error
speciﬁcation has no a priori appeal, and it is overwhelmingly rejected in the post war data.
What we see in the right column of Figure 4 is that the estimated ﬁnancial shock accounts
for nearly the whole of the 1982 recession. Also, the ﬁnancial shock drives consumption and
investment in the same directions. This reﬂects the operation of spillover eﬀects. We stress
that the likelihood of the model on which the results in the left and right columns are based
is the same. BCA provides no way to select between the two.
7.2. OECD Postwar Recessions
The results for postwar recessions in OECD countries for which we have data are summarized
in Table 2, panel A (no adjustment costs) and Table 2, panel B (adjustment costs). For each
country the entry represents the average of a statistic over all the recessions for which we
have data. The statistic is the fraction of the decline in output in the trough of a recession,
due to the intertemporal wedge. This is measured, as indicated in the table, according to the
baseline or rotation decomposition.26 In each panel, the bottom row is the weighted mean
of the corresponding column entries. The weight for a given country is proportional to the
number of recessions in that country’s data.27
Consider ﬁrst the case where the BCA methodology is closest to CKM, i.e., the case with
measurement error, no investment adjustment costs and the baseline wedge decomposition.28
26The numbers for the United States are diﬀerent from what is reported in Table 1, because all results
in Table 2 are based on P and Q matrices with the zero restrictions indicated in (2.7). In addition, the
numbers in Table 2 reﬂect an average over all recessions in the sample for each country, while Table 1 only
pertains to the 1982 recession.
27For Belgium, we only have data for the 1990 recession; for Canada, the 1980 and 1990 recessions; for
Denmark, the 1990 recession; for Finland, the 1974 and 1990 recessions; for France, the 1980 and 1990
recessions; for Germany, the 1990 recession; for Italy, the 1980 and 1990 recessions; for Japan, the 1990
recession; for Mexico, the 1990 recession; for Holland, the 1980 and 1990 recessions; for Norway, the 1990
recession; for Spain, the 1974 and 1990 recessions; for Switzerland, the 1990 recession; for the UK, the 1974,
1980, and 1990 recessions.
28However, recall that we now consider the alternative type of wedge, the τk
t wedge motivated by the CF
21Note that there are numerous countries with fractions that are well above zero. Some are
even above unity, which means that when the intertemporal wedge is fed to the RBC model,
the model on average predicts bigger recessions than actually occurred. Overall, the average
contribution of the intertemporal wedge to the fall in output in a trough is a substantial 22
percent.
As we found for the United States in the 1982 recession, when we then drop measurement
error we ﬁnd that the intertemporal wedge on average predicts an output boom in the OECD
recessions for which we have data (Panel A, right portion). Although the measurement error
used in the analysis is quite small, the outcome of BCA is evidently very sensitive to it.
Now consider what happens when we introduce adjustment costs, in Panel B. When we
include measurement error in the analysis, there are several countries in which the intertem-
poral wedge plays a substantial role in recessions. However, there are several where the
intertemporal wedge actually predicts a signiﬁcant boom. As a result, the average contri-
bution of the intertemporal wedge to business cycles across all countries is now about zero.
When we now drop measurement error, the importance of the wedge jumps substantially for
several countries. For example, it jumps from 15 percent to 46 percent in the United States
and 33 percent to 75 percent in Canada. Some, however, such as Switzerland, go from 31
percent to -14 percent when measurement error is dropped. As a result, the overall average
is a more modest jump of 16 percent.
Turning to the rotation wedge, we see that under that decomposition, the intertemporal
wedge assumes a very large role in most countries. It is logically possible that the entire
eﬀect of this substantial importance assigned to ﬁnancial shocks is due to spillover eﬀects.
In this case, one might be tempted to conclude that these are not actually shocks to the in-
tertemporal wedge itself, and are better thought of as shocks to other wedges. To investigate
this, we computed the ratio of the variance in HP ﬁltered output due only to the spillover
eﬀects of ﬁnancial shocks, to the total variance in HP ﬁltered output due to ﬁnancial fric-
tions. This ratio is reported in the column, ‘ratio’, in Table 2. Note that in the case of no
measurement error and investment adjustment costs, the ratio is only 30 percent for the US.
Evidently, in US business cycles, the great importance assigned to ﬁnancial shocks is not
coming primarily from spillover eﬀects. In other countries, the ratio is greater than unity,
suggesting that spillovers are substantial (see Belgium, Germany and the UK). However,
on average the ratio is only 60 percent, suggesting that the ﬁnancial shocks identiﬁed in
our rotation decomposition operate on the economy primarily by their direct impact on the
intertemporal wedge.
We conclude that our ﬁn d i n g sf o rt h ep o s t w a rU Sa l s oh o l du po na v e r a g ea c r o s st h e
other countries in the OECD.
7.3. US Great Depression
We now consider results for the US Great Depression. In this episode, the data exhibit sub-
stantial ﬂuctuations and so it is perhaps not surprising that there is evidence of inaccuracy in
the linear approximation of our model’s solution. To quantify the degree approximation error
we ﬁrst estimate the capital stock for each date in the sample, by a two-sided Kalman pro-
and BGG models.
22jection using the state-space representation of our model.29 This, together with the realized
wedges for each date, provided us with an estimate of the model’s state for each date in the
sample. Then, for each t we used the approximate policy rule to compute (ct,k t+1,l t,x t,y t)
as a function of the date t state. We then computed the percent change in each of these
5 variables required for the four equilibrium conditions, (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.8), plus the
production function to be satisﬁed as a strict equality at t.F o r e a c h t these calculations
were done under the assumption that the period t +1decisions are made using the approx-
imate solution. Figure 5 shows that outside the 1930s, the approximation error associated
with the linearized policy rule is for the most part fairly small. In the period of the 1930s,
however, the approximation error becomes large, brieﬂy reaching 65 percent for investment.
We report the same measure of approximation error for the second order approximation to
the model solution. In this case, the approximation errors are considerably smaller. Because
of this evidence that the ﬁrst order approximation has substantial approximation error, and
because the second order approximation appears to be noticeably more accurate, we only
display results for the Great Depression based on the second order approximation.
Consider the results in Figure 6. The left column displays the baseline decomposition
and shows that the intertemporal wedge accounts for a substantial 21 percent of the fall in
output in the Great Depression. In addition, that wedge drives consumption and investment
in opposite directions. When we allow for spillovers using the rotation decomposition, we
ﬁnd that ﬁnancial shocks may account for as much as 92 percent of the fall in output at
the trough of the Great Depression.30 Moreover, shocks to the intertemporal wedge drive
consumption and investment in the same direction. We also did the calculations using the
CKM measurement error and the results appear in Figure A9 in Appendix C. The results
reported there are qualitatively similar to what emerges from Figure 6.
We conclude that results for the Great Depression are consistent with the ﬁndings for the
postwar period. Taken as a whole, the evidence from BCA is consistent with the proposition
that shocks to the intertemporal wedge play a signiﬁcant role in business ﬂuctuations.
8. Conclusion
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2006) advocate the use of business cycle accounting to identify
directions for improvement in equilibrium models. As a demonstration of the power of the
approach, they argue that BCA can be used to rule out a prominent class of ﬁnancial friction
models. In particular, they conclude that models of ﬁnancial frictions which create wedges
in the intertemporal Euler equation are not promising avenues for understanding business
cycle dynamics.
We have described two ﬂaws in BCA which undermine its usefulness. First, consistent
with economic theory, the results of BCA are not robust to small changes in the modeling
environment. Second, BCA necessarily misses key mechanisms by which ﬁnancial shocks
which drive the intertemporal wedge aﬀect the economy. The empirical correlations among
29Essentially, this involves using measured investment to compute the capital stock using the capital
accumulation equation.
30Given the nonlinearity of the model, we could not compute the rotation decomposition as we did for
postwar data. Instead, we computed the rotation that minimized the sum of squared deviations between the
actual data and the predicted data using the estimated wedges.
23wedges are consistent with the possibility that the ﬁnancial shocks which drive the intertem-
poral wedge have important spillover eﬀects on other wedges. These spillover eﬀects are
not identiﬁed under BCA. However, spillover eﬀects are potentially so important that the
evidence is consistent with the proposition that ﬁnancial shocks are the major driving force
in postwar recessions in the US and many OECD countries, as well as in the US Great
Depression.
Fortunately, there are alternative ways to investigate whether given model features are
useful in business cycle analysis. An approach which does not involve so many of the detailed
model assumptions used by BCA, but which does incorporate the sort of assumptions needed
to identify spillover eﬀects, uses vector autoregressions.31 An alternative approach works with
fully speciﬁed, structural models. With the recent advances in computational technology
and in economic theory, exploration of alternative models is relatively costless. A full set of
references to the literaturet h a te x p l o r e st h es o r to fﬁnancial frictions which are the object
of interest in CKM would be too lengthy to inclu d eh e r e .S e eC a r l s t r o ma n dF u e r s t( 1 9 9 7 ) ,
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004, 2006) and
Queijo (2005), and the references they cite.
Another approach uses a natural way to confront one of the identiﬁcation problems with
BCA. Absent direct observations, it is diﬃcult to identify the intertemporal wedge and the
rate of return of capital separately. However, as stressed in Cochrane and Hansen (1992),
rates of return are the one type of economic variable on which we have excellent observations.
For example, rates of return do not have the problems of interpretation associated with
wages and they do not have the measurement error problems associated with observations
on quantities like consumption and investment. The recent work of Primiceri, Schaumburg
and Tambalotti (2005) carries out an analysis that is similar to business cycle accounting,
except that they make use of direct measures of rates of return. They ﬁnd that the estimates
of τk
t (which they call ‘preference shocks’) assign that variable an important role in business
cycle ﬂuctuations.32 A related approach is taken recently in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2006), who also include rates of return in the analysis. In addition, they integrate an explicit
model of ﬁnancial frictions and so are able to relate τk
t directly to primitive, uncorrelated
ﬁnancial shocks. When they feed the individual shocks to the model, holding other shocks
ﬁxed, they ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial shocks are an important driving force in business cycles.
31For a recent review, see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2006).
32This approach is related to that of Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983).
24A. Appendix A: The Carlstrom-Fuerst Financial Friction Wedge
This section considers a version of the CF model, modiﬁed to include the adjustment costs
in capital studied in CKM. We identify the version of the RBC model with wedges whose
equilibrium coincides with that of the CF model with adjustment costs. We state the result
as proposition A.3. For the RBC wedge economy to have the same equilibrium as the
CF economy with adjustment costs requires several wedges and other adjustments. We
then describe the parameter settings required in the original CF model to ensure that the
adjustments primarily take the form of a wedge in the intertemporal Euler equation, and
nowhere else. In this respect we follow the approach taken in CKM. To simplify the notation,
we set the population growth rate to zero throughout the discussion in the appendix.
A.1. RBC Model With Adjustment Costs







The resource constraint and the capital accumulation technology are, respectively,











The ﬁrst order necessary conditions for optimization are:
−ul,t
uc,t





























where Pk0,t is deﬁn e di n( 2 . 5 )a n d
Pk,t+1 = Pk0,t+1
∙















In the following two subsections, we argue that the CF ﬁnancial frictions act like a tax
on the gross return on capital, 1+Rk
t+1, in (A.4). In particular, 1+Rk











This statement is actually only true as an approximation. Below we state, as a proposition,
what the exact RBC model with wedges is, which corresponds to the CF model. We then
explain the sense in which the wedge equilibrium just described is an approximation.
25A.2. The CF Model With Adjustment Costs
Here, we develop the version of the CF model in which there are adjustment costs in the
production of new capital. The economy is composed of ﬁrms, an η mass of entrepreneurs and
a mass, 1−η, of households. The sequence of events through the period proceeds as follows.
First, the period t shocks are observed. Then, households and entrepreneurs supply labor and
capital to competitive factor markets. Because ﬁrm production functions are homogeneous,
all output is distributed in the form of factor income. Households and entrepreneurs then sell
their used capital on a capital market. The total net worth of households and entrepreneurs at
this point consists of their earnings of factor incomes, plus the proceeds of the sale of capital.
Households divide this net worth into a part allocated to current consumption, and a part
that is deposited in the bank. Entrepreneurs apply their entire net worth to a technology
for producing new capital. They produce an amount of capital that requires more resources
than they can aﬀord with only their own net worth. They borrow the rest from banks.
At this point the entrepreneur experiences an idiosyncratic shock which is observed to him,
while the bank can only see it by paying a monitoring cost. This creates a conﬂict between
the entrepreneur and the bank which is mitigated by the bank extending the entrepreneur a
standard debt contract. After capital production occurs, entrepreneurs sell the new capital,
and pay oﬀ their bank loan. Households receive a return on their deposits at the bank, and
use the proceeds to purchase new capital. Entrepreneurs use their income after paying oﬀ
the banks to buy consumption goods and new capital. All the newly produced capital is
purchased by households and entrepreneurs, and all the economy’s consumption goods are
consumed. The next period, everything starts all over.









ct + qtkc,t+1 ≤ w
c
tlt +[ rt + Pk,t]kc,t (A.6)
where ct and kc,t denote household consumption and the household stock of capital, re-
spectively. In addition, and lt denotes household employment, wc
t denotes the household’s
competitive wage rate, Pk,t denotes the price of used capital and qt denotes the price of capi-
tal available for production in the next period (the reason for not denoting this price by Pk0,t
will be clear momentarily). After receiving their period t income, households allocate their
net worth (the right side of (A.6)) to ct and the rest, wc
tlt+[rt + Pk,t]kc,t−ct, is deposited in
a bank. These deposits earn a rate of return of zero. This is because markets are competitive
and the opportunity cost to the household of the output they lend to the bank is zero. Later
in the period, when the deposit matures, the households use the principal to purchase kc,t+1















26where uc,t and −ul,t denote the time t marginal utilities of consumption and leisure, respec-
tively.






After the period t shocks are realized, the net worth of entrepreneurs, at, is:
at = w
e
t +[ rt + Pk,t]ket,
where we
t is the wage rate earned by the entrepreneur, who inelastically supplies his one
unit of labor. The entrepreneur uses the at consumption goods, together with a loan from
the bank to purchase the inputs into the production of capital goods. Entrepreneurs have
access to the technology for producing capital, (2.1). The technology proceeds in two stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, the entrepreneur produces an intermediate input, it. In the second stage,
that input results in ωit units of capital, which has a price, in consumption goods, qt.T h e
random variable, ω, is independently distributed across entrepreneurs, has mean unity, and
cumulative density function,
Ψ(z) ≡ prob[ω ≤ z].
The entrepreneur who wishes to produce it units of the capital input faces the following
cost function:
C (it;Pk,t)= m i n
ϕk,t,ϕx,t
Pk,tϕk,t + ϕx,t + λt
∙








where the constraint is that the object in square brackets is no less than zero. In addition,
ϕk,t and ϕx,t denote the quantity of old capital and investment goods, respectively, purchased
by the entrepreneur. The ﬁrst order conditions for ϕk,t and ϕx,t are:
Pk,t = λt
∙
























respectively. The reason for denoting the time t price of old capital by Pk,t is now apparent.
Substituting out for λ in (A.9) from (A.10), we see that the formula for Pk,t here coincides
with with the one implied by (A.5). The reason for not denoting the price of new capital by
Pk0,t is also apparent. Comparing (A.10) with (2.5) we see that the formula for λt coincides
with the formula for Pk0,t in the standard RBC model with adjustment costs. However, the
equilibrium value of qt will not coincide with λt here. This is because λt does not capture all
the costs of producing new capital. It measures the marginal costs implied by the production
technology. However, as discussed in detail in CF, it is missing the marginal cost that arises
from the conﬂict between entrepreneurs and banks. This has the consequence that the
production of capital necessarily involves some monitoring, and therefore also involves some
destruction of capital.
























Solving this for λt, provides the marginal cost function for producing it :
λt = λ(Pk,t). (A.11)
Because all entrepreneurs face the same Pk,t, they will all choose the same ratio, ϕx,t/ϕk,t,
regardless of the scale of production, it. Moreover, that ratio must be equal to the ratio of
aggregate investment to the aggregate stock of capital.
The constant returns to scale feature of the production function implies that the total





Consider an entrepreneur who has at units of goods and wishes to produce it ≥ at, so that the
entrepreneur must borrow λ(Pk,t)it −at f r o mt h eb a n k .F o l l o w i n gC F ,w es u p p o s et h a tt h e
entrepreneur receives a standard debt contract. This speciﬁes a loan amount and an interest
rate, Ra
t, in consumption units. If the revenues of the entrepreneur turn out to be too low for
him to repay the loan, then the entrepreneur is ‘bankrupt’ and he simply provides everything
he has to the bank. In this case, the bank pays a monitoring cost which is proportional to
the scale of the entprepeneur’s project, µia
t. We now work out the equilibrium value of the
parameters of the standard debt contract.




































ωdΦ(ω) − ¯ ω
a
t (1 − Φ(¯ ω
a
t)).
The average receipts to banks, net of monitoring costs, across loans to all entprepreneurs











+[ λ(Pk,t)it − at]R
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t [1 − Φ(¯ ω
a
t)].
The contract with entrepreneurs with asset levels, at, that is assumed to occur in equi-
librium is the one that maximizes the expected state of the entrepreneur at the end of the
contract, subject to the requirement that the bank be able to pay the household a gross
rate of interest of unity. The interval during which the entrepreneur produces capital is one
in which there is no alternative use for the output good. So, the condition that must be
satisﬁed for the bank to participate in the loan contract is:
qtitg(¯ ω
a
t) ≥ λ(Pk,t)it − at.








t) − λ(Pk,t)it + at].
The ﬁrst order conditions for ¯ ωa










t) − λ(Pk,t)] (A.12)
it =
at
λ(Pk,t) − qtg(¯ ωa
t)
(A.13)
From (A.12), we see that ¯ ωa
t =¯ ωt for all at,s ot h a tRa
t = Rt for all at. It then follows from
(A.13) that the loan amount is proportional to at. As in the no adjustment cost case in CF,
these two properties imply that in studying aggregates, we can ignore the distribution of
assets across entrepreneurs.




λ(Pk,t) − qtg(¯ ωt)
at. (A.14)
At the end of the period, after the debt contract with the bank is paid oﬀ, the entrepreneurs
who do not go bankrupt in the process of producing capital have income that can be used
to buy consumption goods and new capital goods:
cet + qtket+1 ≤
½
itqtω − Rt (λ(Pk,t)it − at) ω ≥ ¯ ωt
0 ω<¯ ωt
. (A.15)
An entrepreneur who is bankrupted in period t must set cet =0and ket+1 =0 . In period
t +1 , these entrepreneurs start with net worth at+1 = we
t+1. Entrepreneurs who are not
bankrupted in period t can purchase positive amounts of cet and ke,t+1 (except in the non-
generic case, ω =¯ ωt). For these entrepreneurs, the marginal cost of purchasing ke,t+1 is qt
units of consumption. The time t expected marginal payoﬀ from ke,t+1 at the beginning of
period t +1is Et [rt+1 + Pk,t+1]. In each aggregate state in period t +1 , the entrepreneur
expands his net worth by the value of [rt+1 + Pk,t+1] in that state. This extra net worth
can be leveraged into additional bank loans, which in turn permit an expansion in the
29entrepreneur’s payoﬀ by investing in the capital production technology. The expected value
of this additional payoﬀ (relative to date t+1idiosyncratic uncertainty) corresponds to the
coeﬃcient on at in (A.14). So, the expected rate of return available to entrepreneurs who








which they equate to 1/(βγ). Here,
ζt+1 =m a x
∙
qt+1f (¯ ωt+1)




The expression to the left of ‘×’ in (A.16) is the rate of return enj o y e db yo r d i n a r yh o u s e h o l d s .
The reason that ζt+1 cannot be less than unity is that and entprepeneur can always obtain
unity, simply by consuming his net worth in the following period and not producing any
capital. Averaging over all budget constraints in (A.15):
cet + qtket+1 =
qtf (¯ ωt)
λ(Pk,t) − qtg(¯ ωt)
at.
Here, cet and ke,t+1 refer to averages across all entrepreneurs.
Output is produced by goods-producers using a linear homogeneous technology,
y(kt,l t,η,Z t)=k
α
t ((1 − η)Ztlt)
1−α−ζ η
ζ, (A.17)
where kt i st h es u mo ft h ec a p i t a lo w n e db yh o u s e h o l d sa n dt h ea v e r a g ec a p i t a lh e l db y
entrepreneurs:
kt =( 1− η)kct + ηke,t.
The argument, η, in y is understood to apply to the second occurrence of η. The arguments
in the production function reﬂect our assumption that the entrepreneur supplies one unit of
labor, and households supply lt units of labor. Proﬁt maximization implies:
yk,t = rt,y l,t = w
c
t,y 3,t = w
e
t. (A.18)
We now collect the equilibrium conditions for the economy. The production of new capital








= it [1 − µF (¯ ωt)].











[1 − µF (¯ ωt)]. (A.19)
T h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n ti s :
(1 − η)ct + ηc
e
t + xt = k
α
t ((1 − η)Ztlt)
1−α−ζ η
ζ. (A.20)










The budget constraint of the entrepreneur is:
cet + qtket+1 = λ(Pk,t)
kt+1
η[1 − µF (¯ ωt)]
qtf (¯ ωt) (A.23)




[qtg(¯ ωt) − λ(Pk,t)] (A.24)
kt+1
η[1 − µF (¯ ωt)]
=
at
λ(Pk,t) − qtg(¯ ωt)
(A.25)
at = y3,t + yk,tket + Pk,tket (A.26)
The intertemporal eﬃciency condition for the entrepreneur is (assuming the condition, ζt+1 ≥













Taking the ratio of (A.9) to (A.10), we obtain:
Pk,t =

















The 10 variables to be determined with the 10 equations, (A.19)-(A.28) are: ct,c e,t,x t,k t,
ke,t,l t,P k,t,q t, ¯ ωt,a t.
It is convenient to deﬁne a sequence of markets equilibrium formally. Let st denote a
history of realizations of shocks. Then,
Deﬁnition A.1. An equilibrium of the CF economy with adjustment costs is a sequence of
prices, {Pk (st),q(st),w e (st),w c (st),r(st)}, quantities, {c(st),c e (st),x(st),k(st),k e (st),l(st),a(st)},
and {¯ ω(st)} such that:
( i )H o u s e h o l d so p t i m i z e( s e e( A . 2 1 ) ,( A . 2 2 ) )
(ii) Entrepreneurs optimize (see (A.23), (A.26), (A.27), (A.28))
(iii) Firms optimize (see (A.18))
(iv) Conditions related to the standard debt contract are satisﬁed (see (A.24), (A.25))
(v) The resource constraint and capital accumulations equations are satisﬁed (see (A.19),
(A.20))
31A.3. The CF Model as an RBC Model with Wedges
We now construct a set of wedges for the RBC economy in section A.1, such that the
equilibrium for the distorted version of that economy coincides with the equilibrium for the


















































































where ˜ q, ˜ ce, ˜ c, ˜ we, ˜ r, ˜ k, ˜ x, e ¯ ω and ˜ Pk correspond to the objects without ‘˜ · ’ in a CF equilibrium.
Also, λ is the function deﬁned in (A.11). In this subsection, we treat D, ψ, θ, τx,Gand T
as given exogenous stochastic processes, outside the control of agents. Here, D, G, and T
represent exogenous sequences of proﬁts, government spending and lump sum taxes. Also,
θ and τx are tax rates on capital rental income and investment good purchases. Finally, ψ
is a technology shock in the production of physical capital.















































Here, r is the rental rate on capital, w i st h ew a g er a t e ,a n dl measures the work eﬀort of the
household. Each of these variables is a function of st a n di sd e t e r m i n e di na nR B Cw e d g e
economy. At time 0 the household takes prices, taxes and k(s−1) as given and chooses c, k




















subject to the budget constraint, no-Ponzi game and non-negativity constraints. Here, π(st)
is the probability of history, st.






































































































Equation (A.32) is the ﬁrst order condition associated with the optimal choice of l(st).
Equation (A.33) combines the ﬁrst order order conditions associated with the optimal choice












is the pre-tax marginal cost of producing new capital, in units of the consumption good. In
addition, π(st+1|st) ≡ π(st+1)/π (st) is the conditional probability of history st+1 given st.
The technology for ﬁr m si st a k e nf r o m( A . 1 7 ) :
y(k,l,η,Z)=k
α ((1 − η)Zl)
1−α−ζ η
ζ,
where, as before, the third argument in y refers only to the second occurrence of η.T h e r ea r e
three inputs: physical capital, household labor and another factor whose aggregate supply


























The household is assumed to own the representative ﬁrm, and it receives the earnings of
η in the form of lump-sum proﬁts, D(st). We do allow allow trade in claims on ﬁrms, a
restriction that is non-binding on allocations because the households are identical.
We now state the equilibrium for the RBC wedge economy:
Deﬁnition A.2. An RBC wedge equilibrium is a set of quantities, {c(st),l(st),k(st),x(st)},
and prices {Pk (st),P k0 (st),r(st),w(st)}, and a set of taxes, proﬁts and government spend-
ing, {G(st),τx(st),θ(st),T(st)}, technology shocks, {Z (st),ψ(st)}, such that
(i) The quantities solve the household problem given the prices, taxes, proﬁts, government
spending and the shock to the backyard investment technology
(ii) Firm optimization is satisﬁed
(iii) Relations (A.29) is satisﬁed, for given state-contingent sequences, ˜ q, ˜ ce, ˜ c, ˜ we, ˜ r, ˜ k,
˜ x, e ¯ ω and ˜ Pk.
33The variables to be determined in an RBC wedge equilibrium are c, l, k, x, Pk,P k0,rand
w. T h e8e q u a t i o n st h a tc a nb eu s e dt od e t e r m i n et h e s ea r e( A . 3 0 ) - ( A . 3 6 ) .I ti se a s i l yv e r i ﬁed
that c, l, k, x, Pk,rand w coincide with the corresponding objects in a CF equilibrium. In
addition, Pk0 coincides with λ(Pk) in a CF equilibrium. To see this, one veriﬁes that the
equilibrium conditions in the RBC wedge economy coincide with the equilibrium conditions
in the CF economy. First, (A.31) coincides with (A.19). After using (A.36), we see that
(A.32) coincides with (A.22). Consider the household budget equation evaluated at equality.




















































































































by linear homogeneity. Here, Z (st)=Z (st), where st is the realization of period t uncertainty.
Equation (A.37) coincides with (A.20). Substitute out for θ and τx from (A.29) into (A.33),





















Combining (A.11) and (A.10), we ﬁnd that λ(Pk,t(st)) = Pk0 (st), so that the household’s






















We conclude that conditions (A.19)-(A.22) in the CF economy are satisﬁed. The remaining
equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed, given (A.29). We state this result as a proposition:
Proposition A.3. Consider a CF equilibrium, and a set of taxes, technology shocks and
transfers computed in (A.29). The objects, {c(st),l(st),k(st),x(st)}, {Pk (st),r(st),w(st)}
and Pk0 (st)=λ(Pk (st)) in the CF equilibrium correspond to an RBC wedge equilibrium.
For η and ζ close to zero and ψ close to unity, the RBC wedge equilibrium converges to
the equilibrium conditions of the RBC model with adjustment costs in section A.1 with a
wedge, 1 − τk, in the intertemporal Euler equation, (A.4).
34B. Appendix B: The Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist Financial Friction
Wedge
In this section we brieﬂy review the BGG model and derive the RBC wedge model to which
it corresponds. In the model there are households, capital producers, entrepreneurs and
banks. At the beginning of the period, households supply labor to factor markets, and
entrepreneurs supply capital. Output is then produced and an equal amount of income
is distributed among households and entrepreneurs. Households then make a deposit with
banks, who lend the funds on to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have a special expertise in
the ownership and management of capital. They have their own net worth with which to
acquire capital. However, it is proﬁtable for them to leverage this net worth into loans from
banks, and acquire more capital than they can aﬀord with their own resources. The source of
friction is a particular conﬂict between the entrepreneur and the bank. In the management
of capital, idiosyncratic things happen, which either make the management process more
proﬁtable than expected, or less so. The problem is that the things that happen in this
process are observed only by the entrepreneur. The bank can observe what happens inside
the management of capital, but only at a cost. As a result, the entrepreneur has an incentive
to underreport the results to the bank, and thereby attempt to keep a greater share of the
proceeds for himself. To mitigate this conﬂict, it is assumed that entrepreneurs receive a
standard debt contract from the bank.
The capital that entrepreneurs purchase at the end of the period is sold to them by
capital producers. The latter use the old capital used within the period, as well as investment
goods, to produce the new capital that is sold to the entrepreneurs. Capital producers have
no external ﬁnancing need. They ﬁnance the purchase of used capital and investment goods
using the revenues earned from the sale of new capital.
The budget constraint of households is:
ct + Bt+1 ≤ (1 + Rt)Bt + wtlt + Tt,
where Rt denotes the interest earned on deposits with the bank, bt denotes the beginning-
of-period t stock of those deposits, wt denotes the wage rate, lt denotes employment and Tt
denotes lump sum transfers. Subject to this budget constraint and a no-Ponzi condition,






Households’ ﬁrst order conditions, in addition to the transversality condition, are:








1−α = y(kt,l t,Z t).
35They rent capital and hire labor in perfectly competitive markets at rental rate, rt, and wage
rate, wt, respectively. Optimization implies:
yk,t = rt,y l,t = wt.
Capital producers purchase investment goods, xt, and old capital, kt, to produce new
capital, kt+1, using the following linear homogeneous technology:






The competitive market prices of kt and kt+1 are Pk,t and Pk0,t, respectively. Capital producer






























At the end of period t, entrepreneurs have net worth, Nt+1, and it is assumed that
Nt+1 <P k0,tkt+1. As a result, in an equilibrium in which the entire stock of capital is to be
owned and operated, entprepreneurs must borrow:
bt+1 = Pk0,tkt+1 − Nt+1. (B.1)
As soon as an individual entrepreneur purchases kt+1, he experiences a shock, and kt+1
becomes kt+1ω. Here, ω is a random variable that is iid across entrepreneurs and has mean
unity. The realization of ω is unknown before the loan is made and it is known only to the
entrepreneur after it is realized. The bank which extends the loan to the entrepreneur must
pay a monitoring cost in order to observe the realization of ω. The cumulative distribution
function of ω is F, where
Prob[ω<x ]=F (x).
Entrepreneurs receive a standard debt contract from their bank, which speciﬁes a loan
amount, bt+1, and a gross rate of return, Zt+1, in the event that it is feasible for the en-








Pk0,tkt+1 = Zt+1bt+1. (B.2)







In this case, the bank monitors the entrepreneur. Following BGG, we assume that monitoring








36At time t the bank borrows bt+1 from households. In each state of t +1the bank pays
households
(1 + Rt+1)bt+1 (B.3)
units of currency. The bank’s source of funds in each state of period t+1is the earnings from
non-bankrupt entrepreneurs plus the earnings of bankrupt entrepreneurs, net of monitoring
costs:










We follow BGG, who implicitly suppose that at date t there are no state-contingent markets
for currency in date t +1 . As a consequence, (B.3) must not exceed (B.4) in any date t +1
state. This condition, together with competition among banks, leads to:























































t, contains two additional endogenous variables, Nt+1 and ¯ ωt+1. These are
determined in general equilibrium by the introduction of two additional equations: the con-
dition associated with the fact that the standard debt contract maximizes the utility of the
entrepreneur, as well as the law of motion for entrepreneurial net worth.
The resource constraint for this economy is:




where Gt includes any consumption of entrepreneurs, as well as monitoring costs incurred
by banks. As long as these latter can be ignored, then the BGG ﬁnancial friction is to, in
eﬀect, introduce a tax on the rate of return on capital in, 1+Rk
t+1, in (A.4). In particular,
1+Rk










Note there is a slight diﬀerence with CF ﬁnancial frictions in that the latter imply the tax
rate is not a function of period t +1uncertainty, while the BGG frictions imply that in
general it is a function of this uncertainty.
37C. Appendix C: Other Empirical Results
Figures A1 - A9 display additional results for US recessions. Figures A1-A8 pertain to four
postwar US recessions. Figures A1 - A4 are the analog of Figure 3 for the 1982 recession.
Figures A5 - A8 are the analog of Figure 4. Figure A9 is the analog of Figure 6 for the US
Great Depression, except that it is based on BCA, when measurement error is set to zero in
estimation.
38References
[1] Abel, Andrew, 1980, “Empirical investment equations: An integrative framework,”
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 12, pp. 39—91.
[2] Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist, 1999, “The Financial Accelerator
in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework,” Handbook of Macroeconomics,e d i t e d
by John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, pp. 1341-1393, Amsterdam, New York and
Oxford, Elsevier Science, North-Holland.
[3] Boldrin, Michele, Lawrence J. Christiano and Jonas Fisher, 2001, ‘Habit Persistence,
Asset Returns and the Business Cycle’, American Economic Review,v o l .9 1 ,n o .1 ,p p .
149-166. March.
[4] Carlstrom, Charles, and Timothy Fuerst, 1997, “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Busi-
ness Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis,” American Economic
Review, 87, 893-910.
[5] Chari, V.V., Patrick Kehoe and Ellen McGrattan, 2006, “Business Cycle Accounting,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staﬀ Report 328, revised February.
[6] Christiano, Lawrence J., 2002, ‘Solving Dynamic Equilibrium Models by a Method of
Undetermined Coeﬃcients,’ Computational Economics, October, Volume 20, Issue 1-2.
[7] Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum and Charles Evans, 2005, ‘Nominal Rigidi-
ties and the Dynamic Eﬀects of a Shock to Monetary Policy’, Journal of Political Econ-
omy.
[8] Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum and Robert Vigfusson, 2006, ‘Assessing
Structural VARs,’ forthcoming, Macroeconomics Annual, edited by George-Marios An-
geletos, Kenneth Rogoﬀ, and Michael Woodford.
[9] Christiano, Lawrence J., Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno, 2004, ‘The US Great
Depression and the Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis,’ Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking.
[10] Christiano, Lawrence J., Roberto Motto and Massimo Rostagno, 2006, ‘Financial Fac-
tors in Business Cycles,’ manuscript.
[11] Cochrane, John H., and Lars Peter Hansen, 1992, ‘Asset pricing explorations for macro-
economics,’ NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pp. 115—165.
[12] Eberly, Janice C., 1997, ‘International Evidence on Investment and Fundamentals,’
European Economic Review, vol. 41, no. 6, June, pp. 1055-78.
[13] Erceg, Christopher J., Henderson, Dale, W. and Andrew T. Levin, 2000, ‘Optimal Mone-
tary Policy with Staggered Wage and Price Contracts,’ Journal of Monetary Economics,
46(2), October, pages 281-313.
39[14] Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus, Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez and Thomas J. Sargent, 2006, ‘A,
B, C’s (and D)’s For Understanding VARs,’ manuscript.
[15] Gali, Jordi, Mark Gertler and J. David Lopez-Salido, 2003, ‘Markups, Gaps, and the
Welfare Costs of Business Fluctuations,’ forthcoming, Review of Economics and Statis-
tics.
[16] Hall, Robert, 1997, ‘Macroeconomic Fluctuations and the Allocation of Time,’ Journal
of Labor Economics, 15 (part 2) , S223-S250.
[17] Hamilton, James B. (1994). Time Series Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
[18] Ingram, Beth, Narayana Kocherlakota and N. Savin, 1994, “Explaining Business Cycles:
A Multiple-Shock Approach,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 34, 415-428.
[19] Lippi, Marco, and Lucrezia Reichlin, 1993, ‘The Dynamic Eﬀects of Aggregate Demand
and Supply Disturbances: Comment,’ The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 3
(June), pp. 644-652.
[20] Lucca, David, 2006, ‘Resuscitating Time to Build,’ manuscript, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve.
[21] Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1984, ‘A Learning Eﬀect Model of Investment: An Alternative
Interpretation of Tobin’s Q’, unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University.
[22] Mulligan, Casey, 2002, ‘A Dual Method of Empirically Evaluating Dynamic Competitive
Models with Market Distortions, Applied to the Great Depression and World War II,’
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 8775.
[23] Parkin, Michael, 1988, ‘A Method for Determining Whether Parameters in Aggregative
Models are Structural,’ Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 29, 215-
252.
[24] Queijo, Virginia, 2005, “How Important are Financial Frictions in the US and the Euro
Area?”, Seminar paper no. 738, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm
University, August.
[25] Rosen, Sherwin and Robert Topel, 1988, ‘Housing Investment in the United States,’
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Aug.), pp. 718-740
[26] Sargent, Thomas, 1989, ‘Two Models of Measurements and the Investment Accelerator,’
Journal of Political Economy,v o l .9 7 ,i s s u e2 ,A p r i l ,p p .2 5 1 - 2 8 7 .
[27] Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie, and Martin Uribe, 2004, ‘Solving Dynamic General Equilib-
rium Models Using a Second-Order Approximation to the Policy Function,’ Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control,2 8 .
[28] Sims, Christopher A. and Tao Zha, 1996, ‘Does Monetary Policy Generate Recessions?’,
forthcoming as a ‘vintage paper’ in Macroeconomic Dynamics.
40[29] Uhlig, Harald, 2002, ‘What Moves Real GNP?’, manuscript, Humboldt Unversity Berlin.
[30] Wan, E.A. and R. van der Merwe, 2001, "Kalman Filtering and Neural Networks",
chap. Chapter 7 : The Unscented Kalman Filter, (50 pages), Wiley Publishing, Eds. S.
Haykin.
41Table 1: Summary of Results for the 1982 US Recession
Panel 1a: CKM Version of Intertemporal Wedge (τx,t)
CKM measurement error No measurement error
baseline rotation baseline rotation
Tobin’s q elasticity = ∞
-0.03 0.92 0.047 0.96
Tobin’s q elasticity = 1
0.31 1.02 0.28 1.05
Panel 1b: Alternative Version of the Wedge (BGG, τk
t)
Likelihood ratio test of CKM measurement error No measurement error
CKM measurement error baseline rotation baseline rotation
Tobin’s q elasticity = ∞
481 0.24 1.32 -1.31 -0.01
Tobin’s q elasticity = 1
541 0.22 1.05 0.53 0.93
Notes: (1) Likelihood ratio statistic - twice diﬀerence between the log likelihood
under estimation with CKM measurement error speciﬁcation, and under estimation
with measurement error set to zero; (2) CKM measurement error: results based
on estimation with CKM speciﬁcation of R in (3.6),
(3) No measurement error: based on estimation subject to R =0 , (4) baseline
decomposition - see text, (5) rotation - rotation of shocks which maximizes
importance of ﬁnancial frictions, as deﬁn e di nt e x t .
1Table 2: Alternative Version of the Wedge (BGG, τk
t)
Panel A: Tobin’s q Elasticity = ∞
CKM Measurement Error No Measurement Error
Baseline Rotation Ratio Baseline Rotation Ratio
Country
United States 0.24 0.90 0.49 -1.11 -0.15 1.29
Belgium 0.61 0.83 0.28 -1.12 0.24 0.31
Canada 0.20 1.11 0.69 -0.51 0.95 1.25
Denmark 0.39 1.15 0.00 0.18 1.11 0.92
Finland 1.18 1.58 0.13 0.24 1.31 0.44
France 0.13 1.63 0.96 -3.10 1.59 0.41
Germany 0.44 1.10 0.77 -1.87 -3.29 0.00
Italy -4.83 1.85 0.00 -0.19 1.38 0.45
Japan -0.00 1.02 1.01 0.27 1.67 1.41
Mexico 0.00 1.06 1.00 -0.07 1.05 1.00
Netherlands 2.50 3.02 0.04 -0.01 1.25 0.68
Norway 1.27 -0.23 0.00 -0.56 0.79 0.90
Spain 1.49 1.51 0.00 -0.00 1.66 0.97
Switzerland -0.14 0.95 1.03 -0.24 0.89 1.01
England 0.25 1.10 0.60 0.04 1.19 0.89
Weighted Mean 0.22 1.30 0.44 -0.59 0.80 0.85
Panel B: Tobin’s q Elasticity = 1
CKM Measurement Error No Measurement Error
Baseline Rotation Ratio Baseline Rotation Ratio
Country
United States 0.15 0.89 0.73 0.46 0.85 0.30
Belgium -0.09 0.85 1.01 -0.69 1.25 1.39
Canada 0.33 1.26 0.55 0.75 1.86 0.39
Denmark 0.14 1.05 0.99 -0.17 0.95 1.12
Finland -6.25 -5.72 0.02 -0.60 0.49 0.33
France 1.45 1.43 0.02 1.13 0.99 0.02
Germany 0.33 1.08 1.32 -0.08 0.90 1.22
Italy 0.66 1.29 0.41 -0.51 3.72 0.11
Japan 0.71 1.05 1.12 0.23 2.06 1.01
Mexico -0.04 0.92 1.06 0.40 1.04 0.41
Netherlands 0.76 1.25 0.43 0.04 1.51 0.65
Norway -0.06 1.10 0.91 -0.29 1.53 0.78
Spain 1.93 1.28 0.03 0.67 1.29 0.96
Switzerland 0.31 1.11 0.67 -0.14 1.38 0.24
England -0.01 1.07 0.91 -0.08 1.26 1.24
Weighted Mean -0.01 0.61 0.61 0.16 1.37 0.60



























Figure 1A: Actual and Model Rates of Return, Different Tobin's q Elasticities
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Other wedges: shock in 
intratemporal Euler 
equation, shock in 
resource constraint 
Intertemporal wedge: 








(*) movements in other wedges due to other disturbances 
(i) movements in the intertemporal wedge due to financial disturbances 
(ii) movements in the intertemporal wedge due to spillover effects from standard 
disturbances
(iii) movements in other wedges due to spillovers from financial disturbances 











Tobin's Q Elasticity = f
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 Figure 3: Raw Data ('All Wedges') and Various Counterfactual Simulations






Intertemporal Wedge, ME = 0
Intertemporal Wedge, ME = CKM
All Wedges

















































































Figure 4: Raw Data ('all wedges') and Two Counterfactual Wedges, Tobin's q = 1, No Measurement Error











Note (1) wedge - fraction of fall in raw data at the trough for output accounted for by the intertemporal wedge; (2) R
2 - R-square in regression of raw data on




























































































































































Figure 6: Wedges, US Great Depression Based on Second Order Approximation to Model, CKM Measurement Error, Tobin's q Elasticity = 1










Note: (1) wedge - fraction of fall in raw data at the maximum for output accounted for by the intertemporal wedge; (2) R
2 - R-square in regression of raw











Tobin's Q Elasticity = f



















































Tobin's Q Elasticity = 1















Figure A1: Raw Data ('all wedges') and Various Counterfactual Simulations 
Notes: (1) ME =  CKM - model estimation using CKM measurement error assumption, (2) ME = 0 - model estimation using no measurement error;
(3) Tobin's Q elasticity = f - investment adjustment costs set to zero, =1 means investment adjustment costs implies a unit Tobin's Q elasticity
Intertemporal Wedge, ME = 0
Intertemporal Wedge, ME = CKM
All Wedges
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Figure A2: Raw Data ('all wedges') and Various Counterfactual Simulations
Notes: (1) ME =  CKM - model estimation using CKM measurement error assumption, (2) ME = 0 - model estimation using no measurement error;
(3) Tobin's Q elasticity = f - investment adjustment costs set to zero, =1 means investment adjustment costs implies a unit Tobin's Q elasticity 
Intertemporal Wedge, ME = 0
Intertemporal Wedge, ME = CKM
All Wedges
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Tobin's Q Elasticity = 1














Notes: (1) ME =  CKM - model estimation using CKM measurement error assumption, (2) ME = 0 - model estimation using no measurement error;
(3) Tobin's Q elasticity = f - investment adjustment costs set to zero, =1 means investment adjustment costs implies a unit Tobin's Q elasticity 
Figure A3: Raw Data ('all wedges') and Various Counterfactual Simulations 
Intertemporal Wedge, ME = 0
Intertemporal Wedge, ME = CKM
All Wedges
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Figure A4: Raw Data ('all wedges') and Various Counterfactual Simulations 
Notes: (1) ME =  CKM - model estimation using CKM measurement error assumption, (2) ME = 0 - model estimation using no measurement error;
(3) Tobin's Q elasticity = f - investment adjustment costs set to zero, =1 means investment adjustment costs implies a unit Tobin's Q elasticity 
Intertemporal Wedge, ME = 0
Intertemporal Wedge, ME = CKM
All Wedges
























































































Figure A5: Raw Data ('all wedges') and Three Counterfactual Simulations, Tobin's q = 1, Measurement Error = 0 
Note: (1) wedge - fraction of fall in raw data at the minimum for output accounted for by the intertemporal wedge; (2) R
2 -  R-square in regression of raw 
data on wedge component throughout recession episode; (3) E - slope coefficient in preceding regression
All Wedges
Intertemporal Wedge





















































































Note: (1) wedge - fraction of fall in raw data at the minimum for output accounted for by the intertemporal wedge; (2) R
2 -  R-square in regression of raw 
data on wedge component throughout recession episode; (3) E - slope coefficient in preceding regression
Figure A6: Raw Data ('all wedges') and Three Counterfactual Simulations, Tobin's q = 1, Measurement Error = 0 
All Wedges
Intertemporal Wedge

























































































Figure A7: Raw Data ('all wedges') and Three Counterfactual Simulations, Tobin's q = 1, Measurement Error = 0 
Note: (1) wedge - fraction of fall in raw data at the minimum for output accounted for by the intertemporal wedge; (2) R
2 -  R-square in regression of raw 
data on wedge component throughout recession episode; (3) E - slope coefficient in preceding regression
All Wedges
Intertemporal Wedge



























































































Note: (1) wedge - fraction of fall in raw data at the minimum for output accounted for by the intertemporal wedge; (2) R
2 -  R-square in regression of raw 
data on wedge component throughout recession episode; (3) E - slope coefficient in preceding regression
Figure A8: Raw Data ('all wedges') and Three Counterfactual Simulations, Tobin's q = 1, Measurement Error = 0  All Wedges
Intertemporal Wedge












































































Figure A9: Wedges, US Great Depression Based on Second Order Approximation to Model, no Measurement Error, Tobin's q Elasticity = 1










Note: (1) wedge - fraction of fall in raw data at the maximum for output accounted for by the intertemporal wedge; (2) R
2 - R-square in regression of raw
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